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 The goal of this paper is to investigate the prospects for the wealth assimilation of 
immigrants by studying the financial market behavior of U.S. immigrants, compared to the 
native-born.  Compared to similar natives, immigrants are less likely to own a wide range of 
financial assets, including savings and checking accounts.  Immigrant status also has a 
significant impact on transitions out of account ownership.  We find that lower rates of financial 
market participation tend to persist even for immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for several 
years.  Our results suggest that a large share of the immigrant-native gap in financial market 
participation is driven by group differences in education, income, and geographic location.  For a 
given immigrant, the likelihood of financial market participation decreases with higher levels of 
ethnic concentration in the metropolitan area. 
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I. Introduction 
A central question facing researchers and policymakers is the extent to which immigrants 
will adapt to economic, social, and political life in United States.  One crucial facet of economic 
and social well-being is wealth.  While there is a rich literature that examines the sources of 
immigrant-native differences in labor market, health, and educational outcomes, relatively little 
is known about the determinants of wealth differences between immigrants and the native born.  
In a growing number of studies, researchers have documented that immigrants have substantially 
lower wealth levels and that differential patterns in asset holdings can explain a large share of the 
immigrant-native wealth gap (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2002; Hao, 2004, Cobb-Clark and 
Hildebrand, 2006a, 2006b; Krivo and Kaufman, 2004).  In particular, the median wealth levels of 
natives are estimated to be about 2.3 times higher that of immigrants, and immigrants are less 
likely to hold financial and real estate wealth compared to natives (Cobb-Clark and Hildbrand, 
2006a). 
In this paper, we investigate the factors that influence the decision of immigrants and 
natives to hold wealth in a particular form—financial assets. By focusing on the extensive 
margin, rather than the intensive margin, we hope to shed light on the reasons for the wide 
disparities in immigrant- native wealth holdings. Based on recent data, financial wealth holdings 
are the second largest component of household wealth in the U.S., after housing, and account for 
42% of overall household assets in 2001 (Survey of Consumer Finances, 2001). The relative 
liquidity of financial assets means that they can play an important role in allowing households to 
self-insure against negative income shocks induced, for example, by job loss, illness, and marital 
disruption.  Beyond their role in helping households cope with income uncertainty, financial 
assets also tend to be associated with high expected returns over time and can contribute 
significantly to understanding long-run differences in wealth accumulation.  Several empirical 
studies have shown that the ownership and the value of financial assets is correlated with a wide 
range of economic and social decisions, including investments in health (Roberts and House, 
1996), well-being at retirement (Bender, 2004), home ownership (Haurin et al., 1997), business 
formation (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994), children’s educational outcomes (Duncan and Brooks-
Gunn, 1997; Mayer, 1997), and political participation (Scanlon and Page-Adams, 2001). 
We use panel data from the 1996 – 2000 Survey on Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) to analyze financial market decisions of immigrants relative to those of natives and to   4
estimate the impact of being an immigrant on the likelihood of transitions into and out of 
financial market participation. In addition to documenting differences in immigrant versus native 
financial market participation, we show how duration of stay in the United States impacts 
immigrant behavior relative to the native-born.  Based on unconditional means, immigrants are 
much less likely to hold U.S. financial assets compared to their native-born counterparts.  For 
example, 40% of immigrants have a savings account, compared to 55% of the native-born.   
There is a similar gap in the percentage of immigrants and native-born who hold an interest-
bearing checking account: 22% versus 36%.  While 12% of immigrants own stock, ownership 
rates are much higher among the native-born at 25%.  We find that immigrants also report lower 
rates of ownership of a wide range of additional financial assets, including individual retirement 
accounts and mutual funds when compared to the native-born.   
Controlling for education, income, and other individual and household characteristics, the 
financial market behavior of immigrants remains significantly different from that of similar 
native-born individuals.  An important advantage of the SIPP panel is that we observe not just 
financial asset holdings at one point in time, but also transitions into and out-of financial market 
participation at frequent intervals (every four months) for both savings and interest-bearing 
checking accounts.  Taken together, we find that immigrants transition out of financial asset 
ownership at higher rates than similar natives and that recent immigrants are significantly less 
likely to enter into savings and checking account ownership compared to natives. We present 
additional evidence that the explanation for differential behavior of immigrants relative to 
natives has to do with the characteristics of the geographic area where a given immigrant resides.  
For a given immigrant, the likelihood of financial market participation decreases with the 
percentage of the population in a given metropolitan area from the same origin country as the 
immigrant in question.  One potential explanation for these results is that social interactions may 
play an important role in determining whether immigrants participate in financial markets or that 
immigrant networks provide informal substitutes for formal financial markets.  Like wage 
growth (Borjas, 1998 and 2000), human capital accumulation, and language proficiency 
(Chiswick and Miller, 1996), immigrant participation in formal financial markets appears to be 
inhibited when there is a large network of immigrants from the same country of origin to interact 
with.     5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the conceptual 
framework and empirical methods. We describe the SIPP data and summarize the data on the 
financial market participation of immigrants relative to natives in Section III.  In Section IV, we 
present results.  Section V presents conclusions. 
II.  Understanding Immigrant-Native Differences in Financial Market Participation 
A simple life-cycle model is a useful starting point for exploring immigrant-native 
differences in financial market behavior (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954).  Individuals, whether 
immigrant or native-born select a portfolio from a wide range of assets, comparing returns, 
transaction costs, risk profiles, and liquidity in order to smooth consumption over time.
1  This 
approach suggests that differences in financial market participation between immigrants and the 
native-born may be driven (at least in part) by differences in household income, education, age, 
and family structure.  The decision to hold a particular asset will also depend on information, 
tastes and preferences, and the degree of risk aversion, which may differ across otherwise similar 
immigrants and natives. We recognize that it may be important to account for additional sources 
of immigrant-native differences, including race and ethnicity, legal status, English language 
skills, years of U.S. experience, and patterns of residential settlement, which are likely to affect 
financial decisions (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2005; Cobb-Clark and Hildenbrand, 2006a).  In the 
section below, we describe the empirical models used to estimate the gap between immigrant and 
native-born financial market participation.   
 
Empirical Specification 
1.  Immigrant-Native Differences in Financial Market Participation  
The basic specification investigates the likelihood that an individual holds a given financial asset 
during a given period.  The benefits and costs associated with the financial market participation 
for individual i living in a destination community j at time t can be defined as Uijt, which is a 
function of (Zijt), a vector of socio-economic and demographic variables including, education, 
race, income, household size, and other control variables.  In addition, for immigrants, Uijt may 
be a function of immigrant status, (Ii), and duration of stay in the United States, Di. The net 
benefits and costs associated with holding a given financial asset may also vary by community, 
                                                      
1 There are additional motives for savings and wealth accumulation, which include precautionary motives and the 
desire to leave bequests.   6
Cj, with time vt, and be subject to an error term, εijt, that is particular to the individual.  For each 
time period, Uijt can be measured as: 
Uijt= α + β1Zijt + β2Ii +β3(Di*Ii) + γj*Cj +vt+ εijt        (1) 
We do not observe Uijt, but we observe whether the household has participated in a given 
financial market.  Thus, we observe: 
 Pijt  = 1 if Uijt >   0           
=   0   o t h e r w i s e            
Equation (1) represents the fully specified model.  We build up to this model and first 
estimate a parsimonious specification, which includes individual characteristics and an indicator 
variable for immigrant status.  We use a maximum likelihood logit model to estimate the 
probability that an individual has participated in a given financial market in the survey period.  
The parameter on the immigrant indicator, β2, will capture the effect of being an immigrant on 
the likelihood of holding a given financial asset, after having controlled for time in the U.S. and 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics.  The parameter on the cohort of arrival 
variable, β3, measures how duration of stay in the U.S. affects the immigrant’s likelihood of 
participating in a given financial market.  The set of parameters, γj, measure community level 
fixed-effects. We identify the community as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) where an 
individual resides.  In our empirical estimates, we include MSA-level fixed-effects, which 
capture the effect of community variables such as the density of formal financial institutions in 
the MSA, employment conditions, and other economic attributes of the MSA.   We also include 
time controls in all estimates to capture any time variation in financial market participation over 
the sample period. All reported standard errors are adjusted to allow for correlation across 
observations for a given individual. 
2.  Immigrant-Native Differences in Exit and Entry in Financial Markets 
Financial market participation for both immigrants and natives, measured at a given point 
in time will depend on both exit and entry rates into holding a given financial asset.  In the 
empirical analysis, we also focus on the impact of immigrant status on transitions into and out of 
financial market participation as these estimates can provide insights into why immigrant 
financial behavior differs from that of natives.  Let Vijt  represent the net benefits of entry (or 
exit) into the use of a given financial service from time t – 1 to time t.  The net benefits of entry 
(or exit) are defined to be a function of individual and household characteristics at time t – 1,   7
immigrant status, year of arrival controls, as well as community controls.   Specifically, we 
measure Vijt as: 
Vijt = α + β1Zijt-1+ β2Ii +β3(Di*Ii) + γj*Cj + vt+ ηijt        (3) 
We do not observe the net benefits of entry or exit; instead we know whether the household has 
experienced a transition into (or out of) the use of a given financial service. Hence, we estimate 
using logit maximum likelihood: 
Eijt  = 1 if Vijt  >   0          ( 4 )  
  = 0 otherwise, 
  For estimates of entry, the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual reports owning an 
account at time t and not owning an account at time t – 1.  The dependent variable is equal to 
zero if the individual reports no account ownership at time t and at time t – 1.  For exit, the 
dependent variable is equal to one if an individual reports ownership at t – 1 and no ownership at 
time t and is equal to zero if the individual reports ownership at both t and t – 1.
2  All of the 
transition estimates include the explanatory variables described in the discussion of the baseline 
results and standard errors are adjusted to allow for correlation across observations at the 
individual level. 
 
III.  Data and Characteristics of Immigrants and the Native-born 
The empirical analysis uses longitudinal data from the 1996-2000 waves of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a panel survey which provides detailed 
information about adults residing within households, and is conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  The SIPP collects data by interviewing individual respondents (about 65,000 
individuals) once a quarter about their economic experiences, including ownership of savings 
accounts, checking accounts, and stocks.  The 1996 SIPP panel consists of twelve waves of 
interview questions, where the interview questions depend on the wave.  We include only 
individuals who are 18 or older in our study.  The analysis deals with individuals who reside in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  This allows us to control for MSA-level variation in the 
availability of financial services by including MSA controls in estimates of financial market 
                                                      
2 We should note that the entry estimates are restricted to those who report no ownership at time t – 1 and that the 
exit estimates are restricted to those who do own an account at time t – 1.     8
behavior.
3  The sample includes, about 28,633 native-born, and 4,450 immigrants.  Because we 
observe individuals multiple times, the total sample is made up of 356,769 quarterly 
observations. 
In addition to information on financial asset holdings, the SIPP data include information 
on immigrant status, country of origin, and year of arrival in the U.S., coded into 5-year intervals 
to protect respondent confidentiality.  The SIPP data are well-suited for this study because they 
include information on financial market behavior and on immigration.  Other data sources 
available from the Bureau of the Census, or from the monthly Current Population Survey, 
contain a large number of immigrants and provide detailed information on immigration, but 
include very limited information on participation in financial markets or transitions into and out 
of ownership.
4  The immigrant population in the 1996 SIPP closely mirrors 2000 Census data on 
U.S. immigrants.  Out of a total sample of 29,731 MSA residents, 14% are immigrants.
5   
Our analysis is conducted at the individual level to capture the extent to which 
immigrants and the native-born differ in the distribution of financial asset holdings.
6  The SIPP 
data provides detailed information for all adults in the household are interviewed on 
demographic characteristics, ownership of interest or dividend-earning financial accounts, and 
income.  These data are available for each of the 12 waves, at approximately 3-month intervals.  
While the SIPP panel is relatively short, the large sample sizes available provide an opportunity 
to observe within-sample changes in financial asset holdings for both immigrants and the native-
born.
7   
   
                                                      
3 By focusing on an urban sample, we can also eliminate an important source of heterogeneity between immigrants 
and natives since about 75% of the SIPP immigrant sample lives in a MSA compared to about half of natives.   
4 The SIPP data do not include any information on remittances or the use of informal financial institutions.  This 
makes it difficult to directly assess how participation in formal financial markets in the U.S. is impacted by 
immigrant financial ties to origin countries and the use and availability of informal financial substitutes.   
5 In the 2000 Census, 11.4% of the total population was born abroad.  The higher percentage of immigrants that we 
find in our sample is due to the fact that we restrict our attention to MSA residents, and immigrants are more likely 
to live in metropolitan areas than in rural areas. 
6 An advantage of our approach is that we do not have to impose social norms about the degree to which assets are 
jointly held within the household as these may vary by country of origin.  However, we find comparable results on 
immigrant-native differences in financial market behavior when we restrict the sample to household heads.  These 
results are available upon request.   
7 With any data that tracks individuals and/or households over time, the problem of individuals dropping out of the 
sample during the course of data collection arises.  Our analysis indicates that while immigrants drop out of the 
sample at higher rates between Wave 1 and Wave 2, after that patterns of attrition are fairly similar for natives and 
immigrants.   
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A. Financial  Market  Participation 
The empirical work focuses on two indicators of financial market participation: 
ownership of savings and interest-bearing checking accounts.
8  We emphasize savings and 
checking account ownership because these represent entry-level financial assets with relatively 
low barriers to participation. However, we also examine additional indicators of financial market 
participation including individual retirement accounts (IRA) or Keogh and mutual fund 
ownership, although mean ownership rates tend to be lower for these indicators of financial 
market participation. Figure 1 summarizes this information. The SIPP data provide information 
on whether a given survey respondent held a particular financial asset in the previous month at 
four month intervals for the duration of the panel. To allow a comparison across the two of the 
major components of asset holdings, we present immigrant-native gaps in homeownership (see 
Borjas, 2002; Krivo and Kauffman, 2004). 
Table 1 summarizes patterns of financial asset ownership for immigrants and the native-
born.  Compared to the native-born, immigrants are less likely to hold mainstream financial 
assets.  We find that ownership of savings accounts appears relatively widespread in the SIPP 
data, with 53% of the pooled immigrant-native-born sample reporting ownership of a savings 
account. However, only 40% of immigrants own a savings account compared to 55% of natives. 
Ownership of an interest-bearing checking account is less common, with only 34% of the sample 
reporting ownership.  For checking accounts, the gap between immigrants and natives is even 
larger, with immigrant ownership rates of 22% being only 60% that of the native-born at 36%.   
While 18% of the pooled sample report stock ownership, only 9% of immigrants own stock 
compared to the ownership rate of the native-born at 20%. 
Table 1 also reports summary statistics on exit and entry from the SIPP for savings, 
checking accounts, and stock.  Transitions into and out of account ownership differ in important 
ways by immigrant-native status.  Over the course of the panel, immigrants are less likely to 
participate in mainstream financial markets.  For example, about 43% of immigrants report never 
owning a savings account throughout all 12 waves, compared to 30% of the native-born.  We 
also note that for immigrants the percentage of immigrants who never owned a checking account 
at any time during the panel is about 66%, compared to 51% for the native-born. Similarly, for 
                                                      
8 We focus our attention on interest-bearing checking accounts because information on ownership of non-interest 
bearing checking accounts is available less frequently in the SIPP (approximately once a year).  We obtain similar 
results when we combine both interest and non-interest bearing checking accounts (see Figure 1).   10
immigrants, the percentage of immigrants who never owned stock at any time during the panel is 
about 85%, compared to 71% for the native-born. 
Immigrants report more volatility in their financial market participation status.  We find 
that immigrants are more likely than the native-born to report exits from financial asset holdings.  
Specifically, exit rates out of savings and checking account ownership for immigrants are about 
60% higher for immigrants than for the native-born. Immigrants also have lower rates of entry 
into savings and checking account, and stock ownership compared to the native-born.   
 
B.  Characteristics of Immigrants and the Native-born  
Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics 
Table 2 provides a detailed comparison of the characteristics of immigrants and the 
native-born.  Compared to the native-born, immigrants are younger, more likely to be married, 
have more children, and more likely to be unemployed or economically inactive.  Immigrants 
also tend to be less educated than the native born.  Nearly 36% of the immigrant sample has not 
completed high school compared to only 15% of the native-born sample.  However, the 
percentage of immigrants and the native-born who have an advanced degree is comparable at 
about 7%.  Monthly per capita household income is significantly lower for immigrants compared 
to the native-born.  For immigrants, average monthly per capita household income is $1,619, 
compared to $2,195 for the native-born.  We also note that immigrants are more likely to be non-
white.  About 75% of the immigrant sample is non-white compared to about 23% of the native-
born sample. Nearly 30% of the immigrant sample was born in Central America, while about 
15% of the immigrant sample is of European descent.  A sizeable share of the immigrants in the 
SIPP can be classified as recent immigrants, with almost 40% of the immigrants arriving in the 
U.S. after 1990. 
 
IV. Results 
A.  Baseline Findings for Participation in Financial Markets 
We present the baseline findings in Tables 3.  The key dependent variables in the analysis 
are indicator variables that capture whether or not an individual owned a savings account 
(column 1) or a checking account (column 2) during the survey reference period.  All of our 
estimates include MSA fixed-effects, as well as the following explanatory variables: age, age   11
squared, labor force status, per capita income, per capita income squared, marital status, the 
number of children in the household, sex, race, and education.
9  We present additional results for 
stock, individual retirement accounts and other financial assets in Appendix Table.
10 
   
Individual and Household Variables 
   First,  we  discuss  the  results on individual and household characteristics – income, 
education, race, and household structure in on financial market participation.  These results are 
presented in Table 3. In general, the effect of individual and household level variables on savings 
account and checking account ownership are similar.
  
Income has a strong positive effect on financial market participation.  If monthly per 
capita household income were to increase by one standard deviation from its mean, by $2,764, 
the likelihood of savings account ownership would increase by 12 percentage points, a 23% 
increase relative to the observed percentage of the individuals in the sample who have a savings 
account of 53%.  Similarly, checking account ownership would increase by 12 percentage points, 
and this represents a 30% increase relative to the observed likelihood of owning a checking 
account of 35%.  Being unemployed or out of the labor force has a strong negative impact on 
savings account ownership, but a small positive impact on the probability of owning a checking 
account.  The different effect of age and labor market status on savings and checking account 
ownership is most likely driven by greater ownership of interest-bearing checking accounts 
among retirees.   
Educational attainment plays a very important role in explaining patterns of financial 
market participation. For example, compared to those with less than a high school diploma, high 
school graduates are about 13 percentage points more likely to own a savings account and 17 
percentage points more likely to have a checking account.  Individuals who have completed 
some college are 21 percentage points more likely to have a savings account and 26 percentage 
points more likely to have a checking account compared to those who did not complete high 
school.  The predicted gap in account ownership between college graduates and those who did 
not complete high school is even larger, 24 percentage points for savings accounts and 35 
                                                      
9 While household wealth may provide a more suitable measure of permanent income or the lifetime resources for a 
given household, the SIPP wealth variable is only available in the topical modules (and is measured every 8 
months).   
10 We should note that we find similar results on stock, individual retirement account, and mutual fund ownership 
(and these results are shown in Appendix I).  We omit a detailed discussion of these results in the interest of space.     12
percentage points for checking accounts.  The figures are similar when we compare individuals 
with an advanced degree to individuals who did not complete high school. 
Older individuals are more likely to own checking accounts. There are some non-
linearities with respect to the effect of age on savings account ownership.  While age is 
negatively associated with savings account ownership, age squared has a positive and significant 
impact on savings account ownership.  Being married has a large positive impact on savings and 
checking account ownership, increasing the probability of savings account ownership by more 
than 20 percentage points and the likelihood of checking account ownership by 17 percentage 
points.  Interestingly, men are significantly less likely to report holding a savings and checking 
accounts.   We also note that, compared to whites, non-whites are 11 – 12 percentage points less 
likely to have a savings or a checking account.   The number of children in the household 
reduces the likelihood of having a savings or a checking account by about 2 percentage points for 
each additional child.   
 
Impact of Immigrant Status 
We now turn to the key variable of interest.  Immigrants are significantly less likely to 
participate in financial markets, compared to the native-born.  Specifically, immigrants are 7.4 
percentage points less likely to own a savings account compared to a similar native-born 
individual.  Immigrants are also 6.1percentage points less likely to own a checking account 
compared to a similar native-born individual.  Across a range of additional financial assets—
notably, stock, mutual funds, and individual retirement accounts, we note that immigrants have a 
lower likelihood of financial asset ownership, compared to the native born.  From Appendix I, 
immigrants are 5.6 and 4 percentage points less likely to own stock and individual retirement 
accounts, respectively compared to a similar native-born individual.    
In Table 4, we consider the role of time in the U.S. on the financial market participation 
of immigrants relative to the native-born.  Specifically, we estimate the additional effect of being 
a recent immigrant on savings account ownership (column 1) and checking account ownership 
(column 3).  We define recent immigrants to be those who arrived in the U.S. in 1990 or more 
recently.  At most they would have lived in the U.S. for six years at the beginning of the SIPP 
survey.  Columns (2) and (4) include a full-set of year of arrival controls and allow us to consider   13
how the impact of being an immigrant on savings and checking account ownership, respectively, 
varies more generally with time in the U.S.
11 
While immigrants as a group are 7.4 percentage points less likely to have a savings 
account and 6 percentage points less likely to have a checking account compared to the native-
born, recent immigrants are 18 percentage points less likely to have a savings account and 12 
percentage points less likely to have a checking account (see Table 4, columns 1 and 3).
12  
Recent immigrants are particularly likely to differ in important ways from the native-born in 
their familiarity and knowledge of U.S. financial markets.  English language ability and legal 
status are likely to be important concerns for recent immigrants compared to their more 
established counterparts.  In addition, information costs may impose significant barriers to 
immigrant participation in formal financial markets although these costs would tend to decrease 
as immigrants gain U.S. experience.  The estimates presented in columns 2 and 4 suggest that 
this is indeed the case.  While immigrants who arrived between 1990 and 1996 are 18 percentage 
points less likely to have a savings account and 12 percentage points less likely to have a 
checking account, immigrants who arrived between 1985 and 1989 are only 9 percentage points 
less likely to have a savings account and only 8 percentage points less likely to have a checking 
account, compared to the native-born.   
With one exception, the cohort controls are not significantly different from zero for 
immigrants who arrived before 1985, suggesting that partial financial market assimilation may 
happen in the first ten to fifteen years after migration and then stops.  Interestingly, we find that 
immigrants who arrived between 1975 and 1979 are as likely as the native born to have a savings 
account.
13  Altogether, the estimates presented in Table 4 indicate that immigrant financial 
market assimilation is partial at best.  Taking into account U.S. experience and a rich set of 
controls, immigrants are about 5 percentage points less likely to have a savings account or a 
checking account compared to the native-born.  
B.  Decomposing the Immigrant-Native Gap in Financial Market Participation 
                                                      
11 In addition to controls for being an immigrant and duration of stay in the U.S., the estimates presented in Table 4 
also contain the same set of control variables that were included in the estimates presented in Table 3. 
12 For stock and IRA ownership, recent arrivals are 12 percentage points and 17 percentage points less likely to own 
these assets compared to similar native-born. 
13 The 1975-1979 cohort may have been particularly impacted by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
which provided amnesty in the form of legal permanent residence for undocumented immigrants who could prove 
that they had been living continuously in the U.S. prior to January 1, 1982.  Agricultural workers who had worked in 
the U.S. for at least 90 days in the year prior to May 1, 1986 were also eligible for amnesty.   14
Having documented that there is an important gap in immigrant-native financial market 
participation, we turn now to quantifying the fraction of the gap that can be explained by 
characteristics and by returns to characteristics (or “prices”).   Specifically, we are interested in 
quantifying the key characteristics that drive the portion of the gap that can be attributed to group 
differences in characteristics, and quantifying the relative importance of group differences in 
education, income, and metropolitan areas in explaining immigrant-native gaps in participation 
in financial markets. Given the non-linearity of the logit equation, we use a variation of the 
Blinder-Oaxacca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), which is described in Fairlie 
(2003).  
Table 5 summarizes the nonlinear decomposition of the immigrant-native gap in financial 
market participation based on Fairlie (2003).  The decomposition results presented in Table 5 
suggest that group differences in characteristics and the returns to characteristics between 
immigrants and the native-born are equally important in explaining the gap in financial market 
participation for the two groups.
14  We also consider the role that specific characteristics play in 
creating the observed differences between immigrants and the native-born.  As one might expect, 
education and income differences between immigrants and the native-born play a key role in 
increasing the gap in financial market participation that is due to characteristics. According to 
our decomposition results, individual, family, and MSA characteristics account for about 50 to 
70% of the difference in financial market participation that can be attributed to characteristics.  
Interestingly, differences in the metropolitan areas where immigrants and the native-born live 
play an important role, accounting for about 17 percentage points of the gap that is due to 
characteristics.  This suggests that on average, the financial market participation of immigrants 
would be higher if they lived in the same MSAs as the native-born.   
                                                      
14 For the logit equation, the decomposition of the native/immigrant gap is expressed below.  F(.) is the cumulative 
distribution function from the logistic distribution, X
m is a row vector  of average values for the individual 
characteristics and MSA effects, β ˆ m is a vector of coefficient estimates for group m, and Y
m
 , is the average 
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C.  Unobserved Heterogeneity and Financial Market Participation  
The decomposition results presented above are useful in quantifying the separate role that 
group differences in measurable characteristics play in explaining differences in the financial 
behavior of immigrants and the native-born.  However, while observed characteristics such as 
household income, race and ethnicity, education, age, and family structure play an important 
role, it is also likely that unobservables including tastes and preferences and the degree of risk 
aversion, may differ across otherwise similar immigrants and the native-born.  While we cannot 
observe all these characteristics directly, various empirical techniques help us examine the extent 
to which differences in immigrant-native financial market behavior are driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity.
15  
We take two approaches to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity.  First we investigate 
the impact of adding control variables to the estimates presented in Table 3 in an effort to better 
account for omitted variables.  We are concerned that to the extent that omitted variables are 
correlated with being an immigrant, they will bias the coefficient on the immigrant indicator 
variable in the baseline estimates of financial market participation.  In the estimates presented in 
Table 6 and discussed in sub-section [1] below, we explore the role of ethnicity, legal status, 
language, and other potential sources of bias.  In addition, we make use of the panel nature of the 
SIPP data and estimate transitions into and out of financial market ownership.  The estimates of 
changes in financial market behavior from one period to the next, account for unobserved 
heterogeneity by implicitly differencing out the effect of fixed individual characteristics.  If 
being an immigrant has a similar effect on owning a savings or a checking account as it does on 
transitions in ownership, then we gain confidence that our baseline findings are not overly 
influenced by unobserved heterogeneity.  These estimates are presented in Tables 7A (Entry) and 
7B (Exit) and discussed in sub-section [2] below.  
 
1.  Unobserved Heterogeneity – Additional Control Variables 
Before discussing the results which include additional controls, it is useful to reconsider 
the estimates which include year of arrival controls in the light of unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                      
15 In particular, financial support of relatives in the country of origin and the use and availability of informal 
substitutes for formal financial products and services are also likely to be important sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity.     16
(Table 4).  To some extent, potential biases in the effect of being an immigrant on financial 
market participation due to unobserved heterogeneity are addressed in these estimates. By 
including year of arrival controls, the influence of omitted variables (such as English language 
ability and legal status which tend to vary over time and by year of arrival cohort) will tend to 
show up in the coefficients on the year of arrival controls and will reduce the coefficient on 
immigrant status.  We find that including the year of arrival controls reduces the impact of being 
an immigrant on financial market participation from negative 7 percent to negative 4 percent for 
savings and from negative 6 percent to negative 4 percent for checking.  
In Table 6, we investigate the effect of specific omitted variables on the financial market 
participation of immigrants relative to the native-born.  While we are interested in the direct 
effect of the additional control variables, we are also interested in how much the coefficient on 
immigrant status changes as a result of adding controls.   
For comparison purposes, the baseline results from Table 3 are presented in column (1) 
of Table 6.  The first source of unobserved heterogeneity that we consider is racial differences 
within the immigrant community.  This estimate addresses the possibility that non-white 
immigrants differ significantly in their use of (or, potentially, access to) formal financial 
institutions compared to that of white immigrants because of discrimination by financial 
institutions or beliefs about discrimination by financial institutions. Recent empirical studies of 
household financial behavior have documented significant differences in the use of financial 
services by race, even after controlling for income and education (Altonji and Doraszelski, 2005; 
Blau and Graham, 1990; Chiteji and Stafford, 1999).  In column (2) we allow the effect of race 
to differ for immigrants and the native-born.  In the baseline estimates, the effect of being “non-
white” is restricted to be the same for immigrants and the native-born. We find relatively small, 
but significant differences in the financial market behavior of immigrants by race.  We should 
note that adding the interaction of immigrant status and race actually increases the negative 
effect of being an immigrant on financial market participation.   
In column (3), we consider the effect of legal status at the time of migration on financial 
market participation.  Immigrants who lack the legal right to live and work in the U.S. may face 
additional barriers to opening a savings or checking account.  Many financial institutions, 
particularly during the survey period, required a social security number and a U.S. Driver’s   17
License to open an account.
16  While the SIPP data do not include information on whether an 
immigrant is undocumented upon arrival or at the time of the survey, they do report whether an 
immigrant was a legal permanent resident at the time of migration.  Our results suggest that 
permanent residence has a positive and significant impact for both savings and checking account 
ownership. Immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as permanent residents are about 2 to 3 
percentage points more likely to own savings and checking accounts, compared to other 
immigrants.  However, adding the legal status variable does not significantly reduce the negative 
effect of being an immigrant on financial market participation.   
The baseline estimates of financial market participation include controls for education 
and assume that education has the same impact on financial market participation for immigrants 
and the native-born.  In column (4) of Table 6 we consider the possibility that the impact of 
being an immigrant on financial market participation varies with education among the immigrant 
population.  If immigrants with exposure to higher education (beyond high school) also have 
better employment opportunities, enhanced English skills, and access to different sources of 
information about financial markets, their behavior may differ significantly from less-educated 
immigrants.  We allow for this possibility by adding an interaction term to the set of control 
variables: immigrant multiplied by a variable that is equal to one if an individual has completed 
more than a high school education.   
We find that immigrants with more than a high school degree are 16 percentage points 
more likely to have a savings account and 25 percentage points more likely to have a checking 
account compared to immigrants who have at most completed a high school degree.  Among the 
native-born, those who have a high school degree or more are 13 percentage points more likely 
to have a savings account and 15 percentage points more likely to have a checking account.  
Education appears to have a bigger impact on immigrant financial market behavior than it does 
on native financial market behavior. This suggests that education captures additional aspects of 
the immigrant experience like access to job sources, English language ability, and information 
about financial products and services.  For immigrants as a whole, however, adding the 
interaction of immigrant with a high school education or greater makes the contrast between 
immigrant and native financial market participation even starker: immigrants are 10 percentage 
                                                      
16 Although many U.S. financial institutions require a Social Security number in order to open an  account, a 
growing number of banks accept  Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) as an alternative and 
recognize identification cards issued by consular offices of the immigrant’s country of origin.      18
points less likely to have a savings account and 11 percentage points less likely to have a 
checking account in these estimates.  It appears that failing to allow education to have a different 
effect immigrants and the native-born in the baseline estimates led to a downward bias in the 
estimated impact of being an immigrant on financial market participation. 
In column (5), we repeat the estimation of the baseline specification on a sample that 
excludes Mexican immigrants.  Mexican immigrants make up approximately one-third of the 
immigrant sample and have some distinguishing characteristics that are difficult to measure in 
the SIPP data and that are also potential sources of bias.  Specifically, Mexican immigrants are 
more likely to be undocumented.  They also have higher propensities for return migration 
compared to other immigrants and this may have implications for savings behavior (see 
Dustmann, 1997; Galor and Stark, 1990), for example).  In addition, Mexican immigrants tend to 
have lower English ability and education compared to other immigrants.  Eliminating this 
immigrant group from the sample does not substantively alter the conclusions of the baseline 
estimates.  Excluding the Mexican sample, we find that immigrants are 5 percentage points less 
likely than natives to have a savings account (compared to 7 percentage points in the baseline 
case) and 5 percentage points less likely to have a checking account (compared to 6 percentage 
points in the baseline estimates). 
In column 6, we restrict the sample to native and immigrant Hispanics.  Consistent with 
several studies that have documented low rates of financial asset holdings among Hispanic 
immigrants compared to the Hispanic native-born, we also find low rates of savings account 
ownership among Hispanics compared to other ethnic groups (Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand, 
2006c; Smith, 1995).  In particular, we find that ownership rate of savings accounts for Hispanic 
immigrants is low at 19% when compared to ownership rates of 38% for native-born Hispanics.  
For checking accounts, Hispanic immigrants ownership rates are 10% compared to much higher 
ownership rates of 28% among Hispanic native-born individuals.  However, for Hispanics, taken 
as a group, it is not clear how much of their lower participation rates can be explained by 
immigrant status and how much can be explained by English language proficiency and other 
barriers.  While information on English language proficiency is not available in the SIPP data, 
we can learn about the relative importance of language proficiency (compared to other factors) 
by restricting our sample to Hispanics.  When we restrict our sample to Hispanics, we still find 
significant differences, of roughly the same magnitude as the baseline estimates, in financial   19
market participation between native-born Hispanics and Hispanic immigrants. Hispanic 
immigrants are 6 percentage points less likely to have a savings account and a checking account 
compared to native-born Hispanics.  These estimates increase our confidence that the baseline 
estimates of the gap in immigrant-native financial market behavior is not driven by omitted 
variables like English language ability. 
We have examined a number of potential sources of bias in the baseline results and found 
that they are robust to adding additional controls for race, legal status, and education and also to 
studying a sample which exclude Mexican immigrants and a sample made up solely of Hispanic 
immigrants and natives.  If anything, adding controls for race, legal status, and education widens 
the gap in the predicted financial market participation of immigrants and natives.  The estimates 
of the gap in financial market behavior derived from the sample which excludes Mexicans and 
from the sample of all Hispanics are similar in magnitude and substance to the baseline results. 
Unobserved heterogeneity along the dimensions discussed above does not seem to account for 
the gap in immigrant-native financial market participation. 
 
2.  Unobserved Heterogeneity – Entry into and Exit out of Account Ownership 
In Tables 7A and 7B, we estimate transitions into and out of account ownership.  These 
estimates are of interest for at least two reasons.  First, they offer additional insights into why 
immigrant financial behavior differs from that of natives.  If differences in behavior are driven 
by differences in the propensity to enter into account ownership, then one reason for immigrant-
native differences may lie in differential access to information about financial services and 
products that impacts the decision to open an account.  If the gap is driven by differences in the 
likelihood of closing an account, then lower financial market participation among immigrants 
may be driven by increased vulnerability to economic shocks and the presence of informal 
financial services.  A second motivation for examining transitions into and out of account 
ownership is that these estimates provide another means for controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Since the dependent variable in these estimates reflects changes in financial 
market decisions, the impact of time-invariant individual characteristics (tastes and preferences, 
in particular, risk aversion, unobserved ability, home country experiences, English language 
proficiency, propensity for return migration or for private transfers to relatives living outside the 
U.S., for example) have been implicitly differenced out.    20
For estimates of entry, the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual reports 
owning an account at time t and not owning an account at time t – 1.
17  The dependent variable is 
equal to zero if the individual reports no account ownership at time t and at time t – 1.  All of the 
transition estimates include the explanatory variables described in the discussion of the baseline 
results in Table 3. Our estimates are based on logit maximum likelihood specification and 
standard errors are adjusted to allow for correlation across observations at the individual level. 
Estimates of transitions into account ownership are found in panels A and B of Table 7 
for savings and checking accounts, respectively.  There are two estimates of entry into account 
ownership.  The estimates presented in column (1) of Table 7A include a control for being an 
immigrant.  In column (2) an additional control for being a recent immigrant is added.  The 
estimates also include all of the control variables described above in the discussion of Table 3. 
From column (1) we see that immigrants are less likely to enter into savings and checking 
account ownership, although the effect is not statistically significant.  The likelihood of opening 
a checking account is predicted to be lower for immigrants, but only significant at the 11% level 
of significance.  The estimates presented in column (2) suggest that the differences in the 
likelihood of opening savings and checking accounts for immigrants and natives is driven by 
recent immigrants, who are 1 percentage point less likely to open a savings account and 0.7 
percentage points less likely to open a checking account.   
In panels C and D of Table 7 we present estimates of the likelihood of transitions out of  
account ownership (exits) for savings accounts (panel C) and checking accounts (panel D).  The 
dependent variables in panels C and D are equal to one if an individual, who had an account at 
time t – 1, reports not having an account at time t.  The dependent variable (exit) is equal to zero 
if the individual reports having an account at both t – 1 and t.  Individuals with no account at 
both t-1 and t are excluded from the analysis. 
From column (1) we see that immigrants are 1.4 percentage points more likely to exit 
from both savings and checking account ownership.  This corresponds to a 27% higher 
likelihood of closing a savings account or a checking account for immigrants compared to 
natives, relative to the observed frequency of savings account closures of 5.2% and the observed 
                                                      
17 We should note that the entry estimates are restricted to those who report no ownership at time t – 1 and that the 
exit estimates are restricted to those who do own an account at time t – 1.   
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frequency of checking account closures of 5.3%. In contrast to the estimates for opening 
accounts, the difference in account closures for immigrants and natives is not driven by recent 
immigrants.  The estimates in column (2) show that being a recent immigrant has no significant 
additional impact on the likelihood of closing an account compared.  The coefficient on being an 
immigrant remains basically unchanged in size and significance when the recent immigrant 
control is included.   
Concerns about bias due to unobserved heterogeneity in the baseline estimates are 
mitigated by the fact that we see a similar effect of being an immigrant on estimates of 
transitions into and out of account ownership.  In addition, the transition estimates suggest that 
the underlying causes of differences in financial market participation among immigrants and 
natives are likely to differ for recent and established immigrants.  Recently arrived immigrants 
are less likely to open accounts than both natives and more established immigrants, which is 
consistent with barriers to information and the likelihood of return migration limiting entry into 
mainstream financial markets.  Information barriers and the potential for return migration do not 
seem to limit the entry of more established immigrants, however.  In contrast, all immigrants, 
regardless of how recently they arrived in the U.S., are more likely to close savings and checking 
accounts compared to the native-born.  It seems highly unlikely that this effect is driven by 
information, since this group had enough information about U.S. financial services to open an 
account in the first place.  The fact that immigrants are more likely to close accounts suggests 
that part of the explanation for differences in the financial behavior of immigrants and natives 
may lie in their relative vulnerability to economic shocks.  One possibility here is that adverse 
economic circumstances force immigrants to liquidate accounts more frequently than they do 
natives.  This could be due to the fact that immigrants are over-represented in sectors of the 
economy – agriculture and services, for example – that are particularly cyclical.  Another 
potential explanation could be that immigrants rely on informal financial markets or are more 
likely to be subject to adverse shocks compared to the native born because they provide 
economic support to more people, including family members who live in their country of origin.  
In contrast, the family members of the native-born are more likely to be covered by U.S. social 
safety net programs. 
 
D.  Location and Financial Market Participation   22
A final issue in our analysis is how location contributes to immigrant-native differences 
in financial market behavior. There are several reasons for focusing on location (MSA of 
residence) in seeking to better understand why immigrants make different financial decisions 
compared to otherwise similar native-born individuals.  First, the decomposition exercise 
presented in Table 5 found that if immigrants lived in the same metropolitan areas (MSAs) as the 
native-born, the explained difference in immigrant-native financial market participation would 
fall by about 17%.  Second, many other researchers have found important effects of residential 
settlement on immigrant behavior.  For example, Borjas (1998, 2000) finds that immigrants who 
live in ethnic enclaves have lower wage growth and greater income uncertainty.  The geographic 
clustering of immigrants has also been shown to lower educational attainment and language 
proficiency (see Gang and Zimmerman, 2000; Chiswick and Miller, 2002). 
18   
We examine the possibility that an immigrant who lives in an urban community where 
there is a high concentration of people who have emigrated from the same country may differ in 
financial market behavior from an immigrant from the same country who lives in a community 
with a lower concentration of people who emigrated from the same country.  Focusing on a 
measure of the network that immigrants are likely to interact with seems very reasonable given 
our interest financial behavior as a number of recent studies have shown that social interactions 
have important effects on financial decisions. 
19 One testable hypothesis here is that low financial 
market participation of immigrants may be reinforced when immigrants have a large network of 
individuals to interact with who came from the same country of origin.  Related to this, ethnic 
networks may also provide information about and be sources of informal alternatives for formal 
financial services.  
To measure ethnic concentration, we supplement the SIPP data with information from the 
1990 Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample as (IPUMS) 1% sample of the U.S. Census to 
construct the fraction of a given MSA population that was born in a specific country.  Summary 
information about the Ethnic Concentration variable is found in Appendix II.  For an immigrant 
from a given country, k, (for example, Mexico), ethnic concentration is measured as the share of 
                                                      
18 Munshi (2003) shows that ethnic networks affect employment opportunities for Mexican immigrants even after 
instruments for network size are used. 
19 For example, Hong, Stein, and Kubik (2004) show that social interactions have important effects on stock market 
participation.  Similarly, Madrian and Shea (2000) and Duflo and Saez (2003) show that decisions to participate in 
employer-sponsored retirement plans are influenced by the choices of co-workers. 
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immigrants from that country (for example, Mexico) that reside within a given MSA, j.  More 
formally, we define ethnic concentration for country k and MSA  j as follows: 
j community  n  destinatio in    residing   natives)   (including   s individual   of   #   Total
j community  n  destinatio in    residing k  country  in  born     s individual   of   #
= kj ion Concentrat Ethnic  
Estimates which include the ethnic concentration variable are found in Table 8.  Column 
(1) adds this variable to the baseline estimates for savings (in panel A) and checking (in panel B).  
In column (2) we also add a control for immigrants who have arrived in the U.S. since 1990.  In 
column (3), the interaction of the arrival variable and the ethnic concentration is also included in 
the estimation.  As always, the estimates in columns (1) – (3) also include MSA fixed-effects. 
The results in Table 8 provide evidence that patterns of residential settlement may play an 
important role in understanding immigrant participation in U.S. financial markets.  We find that 
the size of the ethnic network has a significant negative impact on financial market participation.  
Immigrants who live in MSAs with higher ethnic concentrations are less likely to use 
mainstream financial services.  In order to quantify these effects, we consider the case of 
Mexican immigrants living in the Chicago and Milwaukee MSAs.  The Milwaukee MSA is 
located only 90 miles north of Chicago.  However, Mexican immigrants account for 4.22% of the 
population in the Chicago MSA (which is the highest representation among immigrants in 
Chicago) while Mexican immigrants have the second highest representation among immigrants 
in Milwaukee and account for 0.51% of the population.  Across all of the MSAs in the sample, 
the average concentration of Mexicans is 2.61%, and this ranges from a low of 0.01% to a high 
of 33.04%.   
Looking at column (1) of Table 8, we see that immigrants in general are 6 percentage 
points less likely than the native-born to have a savings account. For Mexican immigrants living 
in Milwaukee, the community characteristics do not change this figure too much: they are an 
additional 0.31 percentage points less likely to have savings account.  However, Mexican 
immigrants living in Chicago are an additional 2.5 percentage points less likely to have a savings 
account.  Holding other variables fixed, if a Mexican immigrant moved from Chicago to 
Milwaukee, the likelihood that they would have a savings account would go up by 2.2 
percentage points.
20 
                                                      
20 For checking account ownership, the overall effect of being an immigrant is somewhat smaller.  Immigrants 
overall are predicted to be 3 percentage points less likely to have a checking account.  However, the magnitude of   24
In column (2) of Table 8, we add an additional control variable for being a recent 
immigrant.  As we have seen before, recent immigrants are much less likely than similar natives 
to own a savings account or a checking account.  In these estimates, recent immigrants are 
predicted to be 16 percentage points less likely to have a savings account and 10 percentage 
points less likely to have a checking account.  Adding the recent immigrant control variable does 
not appreciably change the size or the significance of the ethnic concentration variable, however.   
In column (3) of Table 8, we consider the possibility that the impact of living among a 
substantial population of immigrants from the same origin country may differ for recent and 
more established immigrants.  We find evidence that this is in fact the case.  The size of the 
potential immigrant network appears to have an important effect on the financial market 
participation of immigrants, particularly for recent immigrants who may be especially reliant on 
other immigrants who share the same country of origin for information about U.S. financial 
markets.  This is consistent with the finding in Table 7 that recent immigrants are less likely to 
open savings and checking accounts compared to the native-born, but that more established 
immigrants behave similarly to natives when it comes to opening accounts.
21 
Compared to our baseline findings, the effect of being an immigrant is lower in the 
estimates that include the ethnic concentration variable.  For savings account ownership, the 
effect of being an immigrant is 56 – 81 percent lower according to the estimates that include the 
ethnic concentration variable compared to the analogous estimates which do not control for 
ethnic concentration.  For checking account ownership, the impact of being an immigrant is 
estimated to be 39 – 49 percent lower when the ethnic concentration variable is included.   
According to these estimates, somewhere between 20 and 60 percent of the effect of being an 
immigrant may operate through residential settlement.   
By including MSA fixed-effects in the estimates, we address the concern that residents of 
a given community share a common economic environment, or have similar preferences.  For 
example, there may be a lower supply of financial services or limited employment prospects in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
ethnic concentration variable is larger.  Mexican immigrants living in Milwaukee are an additional 5.2 percentage 
points more likely to have a checking account compared to Mexican immigrants living in Chicago.   
21 Estimates of financial market transitions that include ethnic concentration (available from the authors) reinforce 
the message that the entry behavior of recent immigrants, but not more established immigrants, is influenced by 
patterns of residential settlement.  Exit from savings account ownership is higher for immigrants but does not vary 
with ethnic concentration.  In contrast, exit rates from checking account ownership are higher for immigrants and go 
up with ethnic concentration.   We note that these estimates come closest to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity, 
including decisions about where to live and country of origin effects, because they implicitly difference out fixed 
characteristics.   25
one MSA compared to another.  MSA fixed effects do not, however, capture all forms of 
unobserved heterogeneity such as variation in the supply of financial services or employment 
prospects by country of origin within a MSA.
22  Moreover, estimates of the impact of residential 
settlement on financial market participation may be biased because the decision about where to 
live is unlikely to be random.
23 For example, it is quite possible that immigrants who choose to 
live in Milwaukee differ in some unmeasured way from those who choose to live in Chicago and 
that the characteristics that impact the choice about where to live also impact financial market 
behavior. 
These estimates do not tell us the exact mechanism through which ethnic concentration 
impacts financial market participation.  It is certainly possible that there is a direct effect of 
ethnic concentration on financial market participation.  Specifically, immigrants residing in 
ethnically concentrated locations are more likely to interact with and get information about 
financial products and services from other immigrants from the country of origin and this 
reinforces already low levels of formal financial market participation among this group.   It is 
also possible that there is an indirect effect of ethnic concentration on financial market 
participation.  For example, as noted above, other researchers have found that ethnic 
concentration reduces immigrant language acquisition, raises income uncertainty, lowers wage 
growth, and reduces human capital accumulation.  While we are able to hold education and 
income constant in our estimates, we do not have data on language proficiency or income 
uncertainty, so the coefficient on the ethnic concentration variable will capture both direct and 
indirect effects.  If there is an indirect effect it would mainly operate through language or income 





                                                      
22 If country of origin characteristics also influence the choice of destination community (as in Bauer et al, 2005) 
then the unobserved determinants of immigrant location choice are likely to vary by country of origin within a given 
MSA.  However, we find that effect of ethnic concentration on financial market behavior is robust when we interact 
country characteristics (such as the level of financial development in the country of origin) with ethnic concentration 
in a given MSA.  This specification allows us to include both MSA and country fixed effects. 
23 Bauer, Epstein, and Gang (2005) find that as immigrants gain English language proficiency they choose 
communities with smaller ethnic networks, and Bartel (1989) finds that skilled immigrants are less geographically 
concentrated than their unskilled counterparts.     26
V.   Conclusions 
This paper seeks to add to our existing knowledge on the prospects for immigrant wealth 
assimilation, and immigrant assimilation more generally, by studying the financial market 
behavior of U.S. immigrants and comparing it to the native-born.  Compared to similar natives, 
immigrants are less likely  to participate in financial markets.  We show that lower rates of 
financial market participation tend to persist even for immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for 
several years, compared to the native-born.  In addition, immigrant status has a significant 
impact on transitions into and out of account ownership.  Specifically, immigrants are somewhat 
less likely to open accounts and more likely to close accounts compared to similar native-born 
individuals.  Concerns that the results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity are reduced, 
because the effect of being an immigrant is similar for financial market participation and for 
changes in financial market participation.   
Our results suggest that a large share of the immigrant-native gap in financial market 
participation is driven by education, income, and geographic location.  We present some 
evidence that the explanation for differential behavior of immigrants relative to natives has to do 
with variations in patterns of residential settlement, specifically ethnic concentration within a 
given MSA.  Our results on entry into account ownership are consistent with social interaction 
effects, in which immigrants, particularly recent arrivals, have fewer connections with 
mainstream society and lack information about formal financial markets.  However, the finding 
that immigrants have higher exit rates from account ownership suggests that the informational 
hypothesis cannot be the sole explanation for low rates of immigrant participation in mainstream 
financial markets.  Past research has shown that immigrant residing in ethnically concentrated 
areas have low levels of English proficiency and higher income uncertainty.  Thus an additional 
channel through which ethnic concentration may affect financial participation is through greater 
labor market insecurity and greater language barriers among immigrants residing in ethnic 
enclaves.  Finally, immigrants residing in ethnically concentrated areas may have access to 
informal alternatives to formal financial services. 
Our findings on ethnic concentration are intriguing in light of a growing number of 
studies that have shown that social interactions play an important role in many economic 
decisions, including financial market participation, welfare usage, and criminal behavior.  An 
important goal of future research in this area is to identify the precise mechanism through with   27
ethnic concentration affects immigrant behavior – controlling in particular for factors that may 
influence financial market indirectly through location choice.  Understanding the mechanism 
through which ethnic concentration impacts immigrant behavior may have important policy 
implications.  For example, if ethnic concentration mainly affects financial market participation 
through word-of-mouth learning about mainstream financial services, then financial literacy 
programs may have large multiplier effects within immigrant populations.  However, to the 
extent that ethnic enclaves provide immigrants with informal alternatives to formal financial 
markets, then additional research may be needed to understand the factors that increase the 
attractiveness informal financial services for immigrants, compared to similar natives.  Because 
financial transactions rely on trust and confidence in institutions, the financial market behavior of 
immigrants can provide key insights into the process of immigrant adaptation to U.S. social and 
economic life.     28
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 Table 1: Financial Market Participation and Transitions,  1996 – 2000 SIPP Panel
  
All Native-born Immigrants Immigrant/Native
A: Savings Account Ownership
Own % 52.66% 54.72% 39.72% 0.73
Never Owned % 31.91% 30.18% 42.80% 1.42
Ever Owned % 31.10% 30.77% 33.24% 1.08
Entry % 5.82% 5.92% 5.32% 0.90
Exit % 5.15% 4.86% 7.66% 1.58
Always Owned % 36.99% 39.06% 23.96% 0.61
Observations 356,769 307,894 48,875
B: Checking Account  Ownership
Own % 34.11% 36.08% 21.74% 0.60
Never Owned % 53.28% 51.33% 65.60% 1.28
Ever Owned % 23.60% 23.93% 21.58% 0.90
Entry % 3.05% 3.15% 2.53% 0.80
Exit % 5.25% 4.98% 8.07% 1.62
Always Owned % 23.11% 24.75% 12.82% 0.52
Observations 356,769 307,894 48,875
C: Stock Ownership
Own % 18.42% 20.00% 8.50% 0.42
Never Owned % 73.08% 71.17% 85.12% 1.20
Ever Owned % 15.37% 16.20% 10.13% 0.63
Entry % 1.73% 1.84% 1.10% 0.60
Exit % 7.50% 7.30% 10.61% 1.45
Always Owned % 11.55% 12.63% 4.75% 0.38
Observations 356,769 307,894 48,875
Note: The sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18.
"Own" means that the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest bearing) during the 
interview period. "Never Owned" means that the respondent had no saving account or checking account 
(interest bearing) in all the interview periods."Ever Owned" means that the respondent had a saving account
or checking account (interest bearing) in some of the interview periods, but not all. "Always Owned"
means that the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest bearing) in all  the 
interview periods.
The sum of the percentage of Never Owned, Ever Owned and Always Owned is equal to 1.
Entry is defined as the individual switches from non-ownership to ownership.
Exit is defined as the individual switches from ownership to non-ownership.Table 2: Characteristics of the Native-born and Immigrants in the MSA Sample, 1996 – 2000 SIPP Panel
All Natives Immigrants
Age 45.98 46.18 44.70
(17.34) (17.47) (16.41)
Number of Children < 18 0.78 0.72 1.13
(1.14) (1.09) (1.36)
Monthly Per Capita Household Income 2116.31 2195.18 1619.47
(2764.29) (2810.94) (2391.05)
% Male 45.81% 45.70% 46.46%
% Married 58.45% 57.31% 65.65%
% unemployed or out of the labor force 33.95% 33.48% 36.94%
Race (%)
White 70.08% 77.15% 25.53%
Black 13.06% 14.20% 5.83%
Hispanic 11.98% 6.97% 43.52%
Asian 4.42% 1.16% 24.93%
Other 0.47% 0.51% 0.20%
Education (%)
Less than High School  17.86% 15.03% 35.73%
High School Graduate 29.67% 30.48% 24.59%
Some College 29.12% 30.58% 19.95%
College Graduate 15.40% 15.87% 12.42%
Advanced Degree 7.94% 8.04% 7.31%
Immigrant Characteristics
Years In U.S. (%)
Less Than 10 Years 37.74%
10 < Duration < 14 17.28%
15 < Duration < 30 16.96%
More Than 30 Years 15.20%









Number of Observations 356,769 307,894 48,875
Note:  The sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18. 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses ONLY for continuous variables.Table 3: Logit Estimates of Financial Market Participation 
Savings Account Checking Account
(1) (2)
Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E.
Immigrant -0.296 *** -0.074 -0.303 *** -0.061
(0.031) (0.037)
Age -0.004 -0.001 0.015 *** 0.003
(0.003) (0.004)
Age Squared  0.014 *** 0.004 0.009 ** 0.002
(x100) (0.003) (0.004)
Unemployed/Out -0.293 *** -0.073 0.080 *** 0.017
of Labor Force (0.025) (0.028)
Per Capita HH  0.021 *** 0.005 0.021 *** 0.004
Income (x100) (0.001) (0.001)
Per Capita HH  -0.006 ** -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.001
Income Squared (x10
6) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Married 0.873 *** 0.215 0.837 *** 0.170
(0.022) (0.025)
Male -0.299 *** -0.074 -0.268 *** -0.056
(0.021) (0.023)
Non-White -0.432 *** -0.108 -0.629 *** -0.121
(0.026) (0.032)
No of children < 18 -0.082 *** -0.020 -0.080 *** -0.017
(0.009) (0.011)
High School  0.543 *** 0.133 0.776 *** 0.172
(0.030) (0.039)
Some College 0.861 *** 0.208 1.177 *** 0.264
(0.031) (0.040)
College 1.037 *** 0.241 1.489 *** 0.348
(0.038) (0.045)
Advanced Degree 0.940 *** 0.217 1.581 *** 0.373
(0.048) (0.053)
No of Obs 356,769 356,769
Log-likelihood -215936.94 -193291
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.156
Note: The sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest 
bearing) during the interview period in question and is zero otherwise.
Logit model with fixed effects at MSAs level is used and standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the individual level.  
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square 
terms, marital status, male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, schooling dummies and wave dummies.  
The omitted education category is less than a high school education.
*** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.Table 4: Logit Estimates of Financial Market Participation  (with duration controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E.
Immigrant -0.212 *** -0.053 -0.186 *** -0.047 -0.250 *** -0.051 -0.217 *** -0.044 ***
(0.034) (0.059) (0.040) (0.067)
Recent (after 1990) -0.501 *** -0.124 -0.354 *** -0.069
(0.068) (0.089)
1990-1996 -0.531 *** -0.131 -0.383 *** -0.074
(0.085) (0.106)
1985-1989 -0.172 * -0.043 -0.186 * -0.038
(0.090) (0.111)
1980-1984 -0.062 -0.016 -0.142 -0.029
(0.089) (0.110)
1975-1979 0.192 ** 0.048 0.188 0.041
(0.098) (0.119)
1970-1974 -0.048 -0.012 0.089 0.019
(0.110) (0.126)
1964-1969 -0.008 -0.002 -0.042 -0.009
(0.122) (0.139)
1960-1964 -0.036 -0.009 -0.186 -0.038
(0.148) (0.166)
(Omitted Category: Before 1960)
No of Obs 356,769 356,769 356,769 356,769
Log-likelihood -215760.57 -215718 -193235.03 -193228.2
Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.126 0.156 0.156
Note: The sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest bearing) during the 
interview period in question and is zero otherwise.
Logit model with fixed effects at MSAs level is used and standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level.  
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square terms, marital status, 
male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, schooling dummies and wave dummies. The omitted education category is less 
than a high school education.
*** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.
Savings Account Checking AccountTable 5:   Decomposition of Immigrant-Native Differences in Financial Market Participation
Immigrant Native Immigrant Native




I) 0.076 0.084 0.083 0.103
50.70% 55.92% 57.76% 71.61%
From (β
N-β
I) 0.074 0.066 0.061 0.041
49.30% 44.08% 42.24% 28.39%
0.003 0.004 0.005 0.008
1.69% 2.63% 3.74% 5.92%
Per Capita HH Income 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.019
14.32% 12.66% 14.96% 13.08%
Education 0.028 0.036 0.024 0.032
18.63% 23.81% 16.88% 22.41%
Male 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0002
0.46% 0.51% -0.23% 0.11%
-0.009 -0.017 -0.001 -0.008
-6.23% -11.26% -0.68% -5.55%
Non-white -0.003 0.022 0.007 0.037
-2.14% 15.00% 4.62% 25.72%
No of children < 18 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.004
5.24% 4.12% 2.87% 2.64%
Unemploy 0.002 0.002 -0.0002 0.000
1.47% 1.52% -0.16% -0.33%
MSA Effects 0.026 0.010 0.023 0.011
17.26% 6.92% 15.76% 7.62%
0.076 0.084 0.083 0.103
50.70% 55.92% 57.76% 71.61%
Note: The full sample consists of All MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18. To keep the native 
and immigrant samples comparable, some of the MSAs are dropped where  MSA fixed effects
cannot be estimated separately for the immigrant sample due to a lack of observations.
The random sample includes 10,000 native and 10, 000 immigrants randomly drawn from the full sample with
replacement.
Column (1) and (3) use the coefficients from the immigrant sample, and Column (2) and (4) use the coefficients 
from the native sample. See Appendix III for the detailed coefficients.
Logit models with the fixed effects at MSAs level are used and the standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at the individual level. 
The dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest 
bearing) during the interview period in question, and is zero otherwise.
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square
terms, marital status, male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, and schooling dummies.
The omitted education category is less than high school.
Participation
Overall Difference:
Contribution to the gap from the
following variables:
Saving Acct Checking Acct
(2) (3) (4)
Marital status
































Immigrant -0.07 *** -0.13 *** -0.09 *** -0.10 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 ***
Immi*Non-white 0.16 ***
Non-white -0.14 ***
Immi*Permanent Resident 0.02 *
Greater Than High School 0.13 ***
Immi * Greater Than High School 0.03 **
Number of obs   356,769 356,769 356,769 343,464 42,667
Log-likelihood -215531 -215926 -217133 -208910 -22683
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16
B: Checking Acct (Interest Bearing)
Immigrant -0.06 *** -0.10 *** -0.08 *** -0.11 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 ***
Immi*Non-white 0.17 ***
Non-white -0.15 ***
Immi*Permanent Resident 0.03 **
Greater Than High School 0.15 ***
Immi * Greater Than High School 0.10 ***
Number of obs   356,769 356,769 356,769 343,464 42,667
Log-likelihood -192971 -193276 -195226 -208910 -22683
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.16
Note: The sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18. The young sample only 
includes the MSA residents between the age of 18 and 25.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest bearing)
during the interview period in question and is zero otherwise.
Logit model is used and standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square 
terms, marital status, male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, schooling dummies and wave dummies.  
The omitted education category is less than high school graduate.






(2) Race (3) Legal Status
(4) Greater 
than high 
schoolTable 7: Logit Estimates of Financial Market Transitions
I.      ENTRY INTO ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP
(1) (2)
Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E.
A: Savings Acct
Immigrant -0.06 -0.003 -0.01 -0.001
(0.04) (0.04)
Recent (>1990) -0.21 *** -0.009
(0.08)
No of Obs 145,530 145,530
Log-likelihood -30838.41 -30833.90
Pseudo R-squared 0.041 0.036
B: Checking  Acct
Immigrant -0.10 ** -0.002 -0.043 -0.001
(0.05) (0.049)
Recent (>1990) -0.309 *** -0.007
(0.108)
No of Obs 204,202 204,202
Log-likelihood -26430.93 -26723.14
Pseudo R-squared 0.051 0.049
II.      EXITS OUT OF ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP
(1) (2)
Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E.
C: Savings Acct
Immigrant 0.281 *** 0.014 0.278 *** 0.013
(0.041) (0.040)
Recent (>1990) 0.019 0.001
(0.098)
No of Obs 164,900 164,900
Log-likelihood -32261.92 -32261.89
Pseudo R-squared 0.036 0.032
D: Checking  Acct
Immigrant 0.273 *** 0.013 0.275 *** 0.014
(0.052) (0.055)
Recent (>1990) -0.016 -0.001
(0.129)
No of Obs 107299 107299
Log-likelihood -21375.79 -21375.79
Pseudo R-squared 0.035 0.035
Note: The sample is restricted to individuals over 18 living in MSAs 
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual switches from non-ownership to ownership (Entry) or from 
ownership to non-ownership (Exit) for savings account or checking account (interest bearing), respectively.
A logit model is used and standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level.  
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square 
terms, marital status, male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, schooling dummies and wave dummies.  
The omitted education category is less than high school.




Immigrant -0.06 *** -0.03 *** -0.04 ***
Immi * Ethnic Concentration in MSA -0.66 *** -0.72 *** -0.67 ***
Recent (after 1990) -0.13 *** -0.12 ***
Recent * Ethnic Concentration in MSA -0.53
Number of obs   353083 353083 353083
Log-likelihood -213488 -213321 -213317
Pseudo R-squared 0.125 0.126  0.126 
B: Checking Acct (Interest Bearing)
Immigrant -0.04 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 **
Immi * Ethnic Concentration in MSA -1.38 *** -1.42 *** -1.37 ***
Recent (after 1990) -0.08 *** -0.07 ***
Recent * Ethnic Concentration in MSA -0.74
Number of obs   353,083 353,083 353,083
Log-likelihood -191138 -191073 -191069
Pseudo R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.157
Note: The sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest bearing) during the
interview period in question and is zero otherwise.
Logit model is used and standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level.  
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square terms, marital status, male, 
non-white, labor force status, number of kids, schooling dummies and wave dummies.  The omitted education category is less than high 
school graduate.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.
OwnershipAppendix I: Logit Estimates of Financial Market Participation, 1996 – 2000 SIPP Panel
Additional Indicators of Financial Asset Participation
Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock IRA or Keogh Mutual Funds Combined Checking
1
Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E. Coef. M.E.
Immigrant -0.611 -0.056 -0.436 -0.039 -0.418 -0.031 -0.342 -0.052
(0.052) (0.055) (0.058) (0.033)
Age 0.060 0.006 0.215 0.022 0.057 0.005 0.015 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Age Squared  -0.036 -0.004 -0.177 -0.018 -0.038 0.000 0.009 0.001
(x100) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Unemployed/Out 0.241 0.027 0.131 0.013 0.404 0.036 -0.201 -0.029
of Labor Force (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.027)
Per Capita HH  0.024 0.003 0.017 0.002 0.023 0.002 0.025 0.035
Income (x100) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Per Capita HH  -0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.001
Income Squared (x10
6) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Married 0.758 0.079 0.621 0.061 0.819 0.065 0.980 0.151
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.024)
Male -0.224 -0.024 -0.210 -0.021 -0.336 -0.028 -0.372 -0.052
(0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.023)
Non-White -0.770 -0.070 -1.075 -0.085 -0.762 -0.053 -0.805 -0.134
(0.044) (0.051) (0.052) (0.003)
# of children < 18 -0.068 -0.007 -0.153 -0.015 -0.044 -0.004 -0.114 -0.016
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010)
High School  1.185 0.155 0.978 0.116 1.242 0.130 0.886 0.109
(0.065) (0.066) (0.081) (0.032)
Some College 1.650 0.233 1.440 0.185 1.737 0.200 1.386 0.163
(0.066) (0.066) (0.080) (0.034)
College 2.155 0.375 2.041 0.334 2.463 0.382 1.769 0.173
(0.068) (0.069) (0.082) (0.041)
Advanced Degree 2.142 0.398 2.166 0.388 2.670 0.465 1.824 0.158
(0.074) (0.075) (0.087) (0.054)
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
No of Obs 356,769 330,042 330,042 196,787
Pseudo R-squared 0.180 0.217 0.189 0.207
1The combined checking account indicator measures whether an individual held a checking account (interest 
bearing or non-interest bearing) during the interview period in question and is zero otherwise.
Because non-interest bearing checking is measured less frequently, we have fewer observations for this indicator.
Note: The full sample consists of All MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18. To keep the native 
and immigrant samples comparable, some of the MSAs are dropped where  MSA fixed effects
cannot be estimated separately for the immigrant sample due to a lack of observations.
Logit models with the fixed effects at MSAs level are used and the standard errors are corrected for 
 clustering at the individual level.  
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square
terms, marital status, male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, and schooling dummies.
The omitted education category is less than high school.Appendix II: Top-25 MSAs (Based on Population)
Metropolitan Statistical Area % Foreign Born  Imm Pop 90 % Foreign Born 
(1990 U.S. census) (SIPP 1996 Country 1 Ethnic Conc1 Country 2 Ethnic Conc2
Sample)
New York-Northern New Jersey
-Long Island, NY






32.98% 2905552 39.03% Mexico 13.46% El Salvador 2.00%
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, 
IL-IN-WI
15.01% 753332 15.48% Mexico 4.22% Poland 1.35%
San Francisco-Oakland
-San Jose, CA 23.62% 1164254 29.97% Mexico 4.37% Philippines 3.32%
Washington-Baltimore, 
DC-MD-VA-WV




6.32% 271774 6.46% Italy 0.57% Germany 0.51%
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI 6.66% 242155 7.09% Canada 1.14% Italy 0.50%
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, 
MA-NH-ME-CT
12.77% 435377 13.22% Canada 1.34% Italy 1.02%
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 9.41% 265538 14.72% Mexico 4.28% Vietnam 0.59%
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX 14.83% 389256 18.46% Mexico 6.40% El Salvador 1.09%
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL 39.06% 958188 41.98% Cuba 17.32% Colombia 2.13%
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA 9.31% 203895 14.29% Canada 1.16% Philippines 1.02%
Atlanta, GA 4.80% 100422 9.15% Korea 0.41% Germany 0.34%
San Diego, CA 19.51% 367263 27.30% Mexico 8.03% Philippines 2.75%
Anaheim-Santa Ana
-Garden Grove, CA
27.55% 502450                        \ Mexico 11.38% Vietnam 2.68%
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 4.37% 78899 6.53% Laos 0.62% Canada 0.31%
St. Louis, MO-IL 2.56% 45894 2.92% Germany 0.31% Italy 0.16%
Cleveland-Akron, OH 5.94% 105152 3.97% Yugoslavia 0.78% Italy 0.46%
Tampa-St. Petersburg
-Clearwater, FL
8.37% 137736 8.00% Canada 1.06% Cuba 1.01%
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA 2.95% 47556 3.48% Italy 0.47% Germany 0.39%
Phoenix, AZ 8.64% 134719 11.61% Mexico 3.59% Canada 0.76%
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO 6.31% 93315 8.97% Mexico 1.61% Germany 0.57%
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN 2.34% 29902 1.67% Germany 0.44% India 0.17%
Milwaukee-Racine, WI 4.40% 51816 8.79% Germany 0.70% Mexico 0.51%
Sacramento-Yolo, CA 12.00% 131261 20.95% Mexico 2.74% Philippines 1.00%
Note: The Census sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18 in Census 1990 1% Sample.
The SIPP sample consists of all MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18 in the wave 2 of 1996-2000 SIPP Panel.
Largest Ethnic ConcentrationAppendix III: Logit Estimates of Financial Market Participation, 1996 – 2000 SIPP Panel
 Native and Immigrant Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.007 * 0.016 0.014 *** 0.050 ***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013)
Age Squared  0.017 *** -0.006 0.010 ** -0.031 **
(x100) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013)
Unemployed/Out -0.287 *** -0.319 *** 0.075 ** 0.117
of Labor Force (0.027) (0.069) (0.030) (0.081)
Per Capita HH  0.020 *** 0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.031 ***
Income (x100) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Per Capita HH  -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** -0.008 ***
Income Squared (x10
6) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Married 0.879 *** 0.792 *** 0.852 *** 0.646 ***
(0.024) (0.062) (0.027) (0.079)
Male -0.298 *** -0.301 *** -0.253 *** -0.409 ***
(0.023) (0.057) (0.025) (0.069)
Non-White -0.574 *** 0.069 -0.784 *** -0.166 **
(0.030) (0.059) (0.037) (0.072)
# of children < 18 -0.072 *** -0.113 *** -0.0666 *** -0.1186 ***
(0.011) (0.023) (0.012) (0.029)
High School  0.522 *** 0.464 *** 0.710 *** 0.847 ***
(0.034) (0.071) (0.044) (0.101)
Some College 0.843 *** 0.763 *** 1.115 *** 1.266 ***
(0.036) (0.078) (0.044) (0.104)
College 1.046 *** 0.688 *** 1.436 *** 1.397 ***
(0.042) (0.093) (0.050) (0.115)
Advanced Degree 0.910 *** 0.848 *** 1.500 *** 1.706 ***
(0.054) (0.122) (0.059) (0.136)
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
No of Obs 302,247 48,822 298,532 48,256
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.131 0.148 0.182
Note: The full sample consists of All MSA residents greater than or equal to the age of 18. To keep the native 
and immigrant samples comparable, MSAs are dropped where  MSA fixed effects
cannot be estimated separately for the immigrant sample due to a lack of observations.
Logit models with the fixed effects at MSAs level are used and the standard errors are corrected for 
 clustering at the individual level.  
The dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent had a saving account or checking account (interest 
bearing) during the interview period in question and is zero otherwise.
All regressions include a constant term, age as linear and square terms, per capita income as linear and square
terms, marital status, male, non-white, labor force status, number of kids, and schooling dummies.
The omitted education category is less than a high school education.
*** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level.
Participation
Saving Acct Checking Acct
Native Immigrant Native ImmigrantFigure 1: Financial Asset Ownership of Native born and Foreign born Individuals
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